Amos Tversky died in 1996. Tversky's professional ideas and contributions revolutionized not only his own field of cognitive psychology, but that of economics as well. The purpose of this article is to systematically outline the meaning and potential significance of Tversky's insights for the study of political science. This discussion centers on three specific foci: judgment under uncertainty; decision-making under risk; and reason-based choice. Two noteworthy points emerge from this review and analysis. First, Tversky's work stresses the importance of reason-based choice, whereby individuals actively seek to generate, understand, and justify their decisions. Second, Tversky's work suggests that people do not act even 'as if' they were the value-maximizers they are purported to be by more rationally based theories, such as expected utility. Rather, individuals function as problem-solvers who creatively construct their choices and resolve complex problems which require trade-offs between values and goals. In this way, preferences are created, rather than elicited, within the process and context of choice itself.
Amos Tversky died of malignant melanoma on 2 June 1996 at age 59. His life was cut short in the midst of enormous productivity and accomplishment. Born on 16 March 1937 in the British protectorate of Palestine to a woman who became a member of the first Israeli Knesset, Tversky fought in three Middle East wars, in 1956 , 1967 . In 1956 , he was awarded Israel's highest honor for bravery when he risked his own life to save a fellow soldier who became paralyzed with terror after lighting the fuse on an explosive charge. Although Tversky rescued the soldier, he himself was injured and lived the rest of his life with part of the shrapnel from that explosion in his body. His life-long interest in politics should not be surprising in light of his experiences.
Tversky went on to a prominent and distinguished career as a psychologist in the United States. After graduating from Hebrew University in Jerusalem in 1961, he earned a doctorate at the University of Michigan in 1965. After more than a decade teaching at Hebrew University, Tversky became the Davis-Brack Professor of Behavior Sciences in the psychology department at Stanford University, where he remained for the rest of his life. His accomplishments and awards were many. He won the Distinguished Scientific Contribution Award of the American Psychological Association in 1982 and the MacArthur 'genius' award in 1984. He was a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences beginning in 1980, and a foreign member of the National Academy of Sciences beginning in 1985. He was awarded honorary doctorates from four universities, including the University of Chicago and Yale (Kahneman and Shafir, 1998) .
Amos was known to his friends, colleagues, and students as a man of quick and diverse intellectual and conversational brilliance, rapid-fire wit, and tremendous energy and enthusiasm for problem definition and resolution. His wide range of interests included Hebrew literature, modern physics, and professional basketball.
Tversky's professional ideas and contributions revolutionized not only his own field of cognitive psychology, but that of economics as well. His now classic article, written with his long-time collaborator Daniel Kahneman, on prospect theory, which originally appeared in the prestigious economics journal Econometrica, is the most widely cited paper ever published there (Lowenstein, 1996) . Three of the articles he co-authored with Kahneman, including those on prospect theory and on judgmental heuristics, have each been cited over a thousand times in the social sciences since their original publication. At the time of his death, Tversky had written over 120 articles, including 15, more than any other author, in the premier theoretical journal in psychology, Psychological Review. Tversky's ideas and insights have been applied widely in a broad array of fields, including medicine (McNeil et al., 1982; McNeil et al., 1988; Redelmeier and Tversky, 1990; Redelmeier et al., 1995) , economics Tversky and Thaler, 1990; Fox and Tversky, 1995) , mathematics (Tversky, 1964 (Tversky, , 1967 (Tversky, , 1972 Gerrig et al., 1991) , statistics (Tversky, 1974; Lindley et al., 1979) , legal studies (Kelman et al., 1996) and political science (Quattrone and Tversky, 1988) .
The purpose of this article is to systematically outline the meaning and potential significance of Tversky's insights for the study of political science. Thus far, there have been only occasional and often haphazard applications of Tversky's work in political science. Indeed, his most significant psychological contributions could be put to more widespread and productive use if their full spectrum were more integrated, understood, and contextualized for political science scholars. Tversky's main psychological interests concentrated on three areas: similarity; judgment; and decision-making (Kahneman and Shafir, 1998 ). Yet for the purpose of discussing ideas which are relevant to political science, this discussion will center on three slightly more specific foci: judgment under uncertainty; decision-making under risk; and reason-based choice.
I hope that two noteworthy points will emerge from this review and analysis of the ideas of Amos Tversky and their relevance for political science. First, I believe that Tversky was keenly sensitive to what political operatives and media buffs would call 'spin'. By focusing on such notions as framing, Tversky's work provides an acute appreciation and analysis of reason-based choice, whereby individuals in general, and politicians in particular, actively seek to generate, understand, and justify their decisions in light of the often emotionally laden rationales which make the most compelling sense to themselves and their constituents.
Second, Tversky's work suggests that often people do not act even 'as if' they were the value-maximizers they are purported to be by more rationally based theories, such as expected utility. Rather, individuals function as problem-solvers who creatively construct their choices, resolve complex problems which require trade-offs between values and goals, and justify their decisions to themselves and others. In this way, preferences are assumed to be created, rather than elicited, within the process and context of choice itself.
Judgment Under Uncertainty
Politicians, academics, and others make 'judgments', 'decisions', and 'choices' all the time, consciously or otherwise, in action or reaction. But in attempting to pull these activities apart analytically, each concept bears further investigation if we are to begin to understand what we are actually doing when we make judgments and decisions.
Judgments are fundamentally different from decisions. First, judgments typically take place prior to decisions. Second, judgments are assessments about external events while decisions are internal evaluations which often involve some kind of value trade-off. Last, judgments often happen under conditions of uncertainty whereas decisions often happen under conditions of risk.
Judgments involve appraisals about the likelihood, probability, or frequency of an outcome or event which is unknown or unknowable. For example, when Kennedy tried to figure out how the Soviets would respond to various potential American responses in the Cuban Missile Crisis, he was making judgments about the likelihood that if the United States did one thing, like attack Cuba, the Soviets would do another, like launch missiles on the United States.
Judgments often happen under conditions of uncertainty, which means that probabilities are not assumed to be known, unlike when one is assumed to know the probability of heads on the toss of a fair coin to be 50 percent. Judgments would not be needed if probabilities were certain; as such, judgments are fundamentally subjective in nature. Decisions, on the other hand, often happen under conditions of risk, where the probabilities associated with each outcome have been predetermined either objectively or through subjective judgment ratings. Obviously, if decisions are based on probability judgments which were originally subjective in nature, even if well informed, there is room for error at both levels.
Once judgments have been reached, individuals make decisions based on them. These decisions can be elicited in a variety of ways. Two of the most common are choice and matching Slovic et al., 1990) . In choice, an either-or decision is typically made between two options, in order to show that one option is preferred over the second. This occurs in such cases as the simplified budget dilemma of whether to spend taxes on guns or butter. Note that at this point decisions do not involve judgments about the likelihood of various outcomes. Calculations about how many people will be out of work or how vulnerable the military will be to attack may be a cause for dispute, but those probabilities are typically rendered prior to the value-laden decision-making process.
In matching, a decision-maker is asked how much of one attribute would be needed to make it equal in value to another. For example, matching decisions typically confront consumers who must decide how much of a sale is required to make it worth buying an inferior product at a lower price. In addition, weapon procurement decisions often require matching decisions between cost and some other value, like accuracy or reliability. Much of Tversky's work examined the discrepancy in people's decisions when confronted with various forms of elicitation. People tend not to reach the same outcome when making choice versus matching decisions, as they should if classical economic theory held true. In work on judgment which Tversky conducted with colleagues (Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, 1982) , three heuristics, or rules of thumb, were delineated and explored. These rules of thumb are assumed to have evolved because they are basically effective and efficient means by which to make mostly accurate judgments of frequency. However, these heuristics can lead to systematic, predictable bias in judgment. Kanwisher (1989) , for one, has explored how these heuristics can bias American security policy in systematic ways. These judgmental heuristics are: representativeness; availability; and anchoring, and they can affect political judgment in several critical ways.
Representativeness
Representativeness Kahneman, 1974, 1983) occurs when a person judges that the probability of one object or event belongs to a particular category based on the similarity between them. Kahneman and Tversky (1973) found evidence for this phenomenon in areas ranging from personality judgments and medical prognosis to political forecasting. While similarity often provides a good clue for judgment, the representativeness heuristic leads to systematic underutilization of the base rate, or prior probability, which is necessary to render accurate judgments in Bayesian terms. Bayes' theorem offers a statistically sound model for making predictions, using prior odds and probability ratios to calculate the likelihood of future events. When people invoke the representativeness heuristic, they do not take full account of the prior odds, or base rates, in making these predictions.
The original experiment asked subjects to judge whether a given individual, Jack, was an engineer, given that engineers comprised 30 percent of the larger population of engineers and lawyers. When the only information provided was the percentage of engineers, subjects utilized prior probabilities appropriately to assess the likelihood that Jack was an engineer. But when subjects were provided with either useless personal information, or a personal description which conformed (or deviated) from the engineering stereotype, enhanced (or weakened) assessments of the similarity between the person and the engineering stereotype made subjects ignore prior probabilities; rather, subjects based their judgments almost entirely on the degree of similarity between the person and the preexisting stereotype.
In addition, and just as striking in some ways, Kahneman and Tversky (1973) found that people were most confident of those judgments which were most likely to be incorrect from a normative standpoint. Individual confidence increased with factors such as consistency and extremity which are often negatively correlated with predictive accuracy. Jervis (1986) has argued that representativeness is not as great a problem in foreign policy as might be suspected because decision-makers often rely on prior probabilities as part of causal arguments. He argues that the theory-driven nature of perception encourages an active role for prior probabilities in foreign policy decision-making through this causal mechanism.
While this may be so, there are at least three ways in which representativeness can affect foreign policy decision-making in ways which might promote systematic bias in judgment. First, Tversky's work (Tversky and Kahneman, 1983) on the conjunctive fallacy demonstrates how specific scenarios are judged to be more likely because they are more representative. One of the most basic laws of probability, the conjunction rule, states that the probability of a conjunction of two component parts, A and B, cannot exceed the probability of its components, the probability of A and the probability of B, because the conjunction is a subset of the probability of each part (Bar-Hillel, 1973 Bar-Hillel and Neter, 1993 ). Yet it is often the case in judgment under uncertainty that the conjunction is more psychologically representative than either of the component parts alone. The conjunction is thus often intuitively judged to be more probable than would be indicated by normative rules. Tversky and Kahneman's (1983) experiment demonstrated how subjects judged it more likely that a strong-willed woman, Linda, was both a bankteller and a feminist rather than merely a bank-teller alone. Obviously this is wrong because the conjunction should always be judged less likely than the single case; all cases of bank-tellers who are also feminists must be in the larger bank-teller category, along with all the other tellers who are not feminists (Bar-Hillel and Neter, 1993) .
As noted, this fallacy can lead to the subjective overestimation of representative scenarios, especially when a conjunction makes the overall story more easily imaginable, and thus more intuitively compelling. This process can influence political planning and forecasting in significant ways. As Tversky and Kahneman (1983: 307) write, 'a scenario that includes a possible cause and an outcome could appear more probable than the outcome on its own'. Indeed, intuition tells us that it is easier and more natural to imagine an effect given a particular cause than to think about the effect in isolation. In a variant of this experiment, subjects were asked to evaluate which of the following scenarios was more likely: 'a complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the USA and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983' or 'a Russian invasion of Poland, and a complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the USA and the Soviet Union sometime in 1983'. It should not be surprising that subjects judged the latter to be more likely than the former, although the latter is merely a subset of the former (Plous, 1992) . Readers might note that even with this normative recognition, it is hard not to find the second scenario more intui-tively plausible.
This example demonstrates a couple of compelling insights. First, the conjunctive fallacy results in judgments which privilege the outcomes of conjunctive scenarios with embedded causal arguments over outcomes which, although objectively just as likely, result from less easily imaginable sequences of events. Note that this argument is not at odds with Jervis' (1993) claim about the importance of causal chains, although the current argument expects a greater impact of representativeness on decisionmaking than Jervis sees.
Second, careful planning filled with conjunctive and representative events will be judged to be more likely than any larger, more inclusive set of those events although that is not normatively the case. 1 As a result, decisionmakers will favor planning which tells a good story, or can be easily envisioned, over more complicated plans filled with unlikely contingencies; this may be the case even when those latter scenarios may be just as likely, or more so, to occur. In short, leaders will tend toward assuming that the outcome which is most likely is the one which is most representative of the evidence, while remaining insensitive to the importance of history for the accuracy of future prediction.
A second aspect of representativeness which can affect political judgment lies in the area of non-regressive prediction, where people fail to acknowledge the ways in which extreme observations are typically followed by measures closer to the mean. So, for example, tall parents are more likely to have children whose height is closer to mean height than to their own, just as highly intelligent parents are similarly likely to have children whose IQ is closer to the mean than their own.
Tversky himself originally became intrigued by this idea when he noticed that Israeli fighter jet instructors were loath to reward good test flights but quick to criticize bad ones. Flight trainers believed from experience that good flights met with praise produced a worse flight later, while poor flights dealt with critically resulted in better flights following. Tversky knew that these effects were best explained by non-regressive prediction, and explained that extreme flights were more likely to be followed by tests closer to the mean regardless of feedback. In the long run, praise does a better job of increasing overall performance, but this would not have been recognized by flight instructors who continued to fall prey to representativeness in this way.
Last, one of the ways in which representativeness is most likely to affect political judgment is through the use of historical analogies as instructive for future action (Jervis, 1968 (Jervis, , 1989 May, 1973; Herrmann, 1986; Nye, 1987; Khong, 1992; Levy, 1994a, b; Taylor and Rourke, 1995) . Whenever a politician raises the specter of Munich or Vietnam in making an argument for or against foreign military intervention, respectively, he is implicitly drawing on representativeness to advocate his/her prescribed policy. By arguing that the cause or event in the present somehow resembles that of the past, the resulting conclusion is supposed to reflect the lessons learned from past experience. While present and the past situations may be similar, although probably less so than argued because of the sheer complexity of events, this does not mean that the policy of the past, or the policy that should have been used in the past, is the correct one for the present. And yet that is precisely where representativeness can lead the unsuspecting advocate or listener astray.
Representativeness holds great applicability for politics because individuals rank the likelihood of outcomes by how similar they are to preceding events. This means that rare and extreme events, such as chemical or biological warfare, might be judged more likely than they are because they are representative of well established, compelling, pre-existing scenarios of how such events might occur. The strength of the narrative and causal claim, in turn, leads to unjustified levels of confidence and false intuitions on the part of decision-makers who believe policies which are carefully planned to avoid 'predictable' failures and crises are adequate. Too many moderately probable, but less easily imaginable outcomes, like accidents, overlooked occurrences, mistakes, or intentional disruption are ignored or underappreciated because the outcomes are not so easily representative of the preceding events.
Availability
Availability Kahneman, 1973, 1974) , the second judgmental heuristic, demonstrates how frequency is judged according to the strength of associations in memory or imagination. The strength or immediacy of the association is taken as an indication of the judged frequency of the event. Events which are easier to imagine are judged to be more likely simply because they are more cognitively accessible. There are at least three ways in which this heuristic can affect political judgment.
First, one of the primary characteristics of cognitive availability is that vividness provides a more compelling basis for judgment than dry, abstract, or pallid data (Borgida and Nisbett, 1977; Lichtenstein et al., 1978) . Information that is visually or emotionally compelling is much more likely to affect our assessments of frequency than more objectively useful, but less interesting, data.
News networks know, for example, that one picture of a starving Ethiopian child is worth more than all the reports issued by the United Nations put together. Such a 'CNN effect' might argue that American foreign policy is influenced by the dramatic pictures that appear on the nightly news. Those who remember the Gulf War might have been surprised, for instance, to later discover that those Patriot missiles which were seen to intercept incoming missiles were not nearly as accurate in reality as they appeared on television. Yet ignoring abstract data in favor of personal impressions happens not only when academic departments invite job candidates out for interviews because they trust their own personal impressions over written evaluations based on more extensive input, but also when intelligence agents allow personal impressions of a foreign leader, for example, to displace more extensive, but less vivid, information about a country's military intentions.
Second, availability can drastically affect the judged likelihoods of worst and best case scenario planning in areas as widespread as intelligence gathering, weapons procurement, and other policy analyses. When the plausibility of best and worst case scenarios are judged by the ease of access or imagination, creativity is quickly restricted to the most obvious alternatives and choices. This means that scenarios which may be less likely but are easy to imagine, like a military invasion, are much more likely to result in extensive contingency planning than more diffuse or complex scenarios such as trade negotiations involving copyright pirating or technology theft, which may be more likely to occur but harder to envision. In addition, hard-toimagine outcomes are judged to be less likely, not because they are so, but because the availability of examples are remote. In theory development as well as policy implementation, such restrictions hamper ingenuity.
Last, emotion plays an important role in availability in decision-making, as well as other areas (D'Amasio et al., 1994) . Emotion provides the most rapid cues for all kinds of cognitive processes and makes certain responses, events, and outcomes seem more likely than they are because they are so quickly and readily available. D'Amasio (1994) has demonstrated how patients with damage to the limbic region of the brain which controls emotion are not really capable of making reasoned decisions; this is because they lack the contribution of emotional responses which guide our sense of good and bad, right and wrong. D'Amasio's patients have normal IQs but are not able to sustain jobs or relationships, and have problems with impulse control that get them into trouble with substance abuse, compulsive shopping, gambling, and the law. In one set of experiments, D'Amasio demonstrated that, over time, normal subjects can learn to pick the deck of cards which returns the highest overall payoff, even when there are many early and heavy losses over a deck with high early payoffs, heavier costs later, and a lower overall payoff. Subjects with lesions on the limbic region of their brain never learn this lesson because their emotions do not provide the same emotional feedback that normal subjects receive. After a few trials, normal subjects report feeling odd or bad about the decks of cards which present high losses later, even before these losses actually appear; they quickly learn to prefer the decks which make them feel good because they have learned those decks carry the largest ultimate payoffs. By contrast, patients with lesions never receive this emotional guidance and continue to act on the immediate feedback of the moment, thus continuing to prefer the decks with large early payoffs and later heavy losses.
Because emotions are necessary for making optimal decisions, such as those requiring delay of gratification, emotion is not irrational but rather rationality is dependent on emotion for adequate functioning. Obviously, not all emotions are helpful in making a decision that might be seen by others as 'rational' from a cost-benefit standpoint. However, what most fail to realize is that emotional responses are necessary in order to make any decision at all. As a result, although anger, hate, and revenge make certain scenarios appear more available, and thus judged to be more likely than they might be objectively, these emotional cues are in no way merely motivational in nature. Emotions, in addition to being rational in judgment, are cognitive in impact.
Anchoring and Adjustment
Anchoring and adjustment (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974 ) is the third judgmental heuristic of note. In this case, predictions are based on initial values which are insufficiently adjusted to new information. This bias appears to exert a powerful impact even when subjects are explicitly told that the original estimate has no relation to or bearing upon the later judgment. Plous (1989) conducted an experiment looking at the effects of anchoring on subjects' estimates of the likelihood of nuclear war. Even when subjects knew that the original anchors were unrelated to anything having to do with nuclear war, they still were affected by the earlier estimates in ways which systematically biased their stated likelihoods for the occurrence of nuclear war in the direction of the earlier irrelevant anchor.
There is one important way in which this can affect political planning and judgment: people show a tendency to underestimate the probability of independent events combining to increase the likelihood of an overall outcome. This is critical for failure analysis and planning because many people fail to realize, for example, that a system with 100 parts, each with a one in a 100 chance of failure, does not have an overall chance of failure of one in a 100; rather, failure is eventually almost certain, assuming that failure of one part equals failure of the whole system. When many component parts must work together for the overall system to operate correctly, such combined effects can lead to critical errors by failing to have enough back-up systems in place, for example.
The important point here in terms of anchoring and adjustment is that people do not act as Bayesians and mathematically calculate the odds of failure prior to decision-making. This may have played a part in the explosion of the space shuttle Challenger, because although each O-ring may have had a very low probability of failure, enough O-rings were required to work flawlessly in concert with other highly complex components to drastically increase the probability of at least one of them failing at some point.
While these heuristics in general reduce the time and effort that it takes people to render adequate judgments, they lead to systematic and predictable biases which can affect political judgments and planning in critical and pervasive ways.
Decision-making Under Risk
The second main area of Amos Tversky's research which is relevant for the study of politics concentrates on decision-making under conditions of risk. Once judgments are reached, decisions which are based on them must be made; and these decisions are often complicated by the presence of risk, whereby something of value might be lost or something of value might not be gained if the wrong choice is made. Defining what constitutes such gain or loss focuses attention on the reference point, which can change over time and during the dynamic of a crisis, as individuals quickly accommodate to gains, and fail to renormalize to losses.
Conditions of risk challenge decision-makers to pay attention to the costs and benefits of various options. Yet decision-makers often ignore normatively appropriate procedures for doing so and base their decisions on processes which are often biased away from loss in systematic, yet often unjustified ways. Kahneman and Tversky (1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) describe these decision-making strategies in their work on prospect theory.
Overview of Prospect Theory
Prospect theory is a psychological theory of decision-making under conditions of risk (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979 , 1984 Tversky and Kahneman, 1981 . According to the theory, decisions may be broken into two phases: an editing phase and an evaluation phase. In the editing phase, options, contingencies, and outcomes are represented for a decision-maker prior to choice. This is the phase where so-called framing effects can come into play. Framing refers to the way in which options are represented. Contrary to normative claims which assume dominance, invariance, and transitivity in choice, prospects can be substantively affected by the method, order, or manner of presentation. Since trivial shifts in elicitation procedures can exhort a dramatic impact on choice, possibilities for the external manipulation of a decision-maker arise in this context.
In their now familiar framing experiment, Tversky and Kahneman (1981) asked subjects how they might respond to the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease. When the options were presented in terms of how many people would die, subjects made a different choice than when the exact same numbers were presented in terms of how many people would live. More striking, perhaps, is that doctors and their patients changed real life choice about whether to undergo radiation or chemotherapy as treatment for their cancer based on simple shifts in the framing of options in terms of survival versus mortality rates (McNeil et al., 1982) .
The editing, or framing, phase is primarily directed by two heuristics: segregation and acceptance (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) . Acceptance refers to the way decision-makers are loath to reframe a problem in a way which differs from the original form of presentation. For example, figures on unemployment are rarely reformulated by a decision-maker into numbers on employment rates unless there is a compelling reason to do so. Yet politicians will reformulate issues and topics when they realize the importance of framing the debate in the most useful way for their cause. The importance of such rhetorical constructions cannot be doubted by any who have witnessed the evolving language of the abortion debate, where great efforts have been put into recasting 'anti-abortion' advocates as 'pro-life', or 'pro-abortion' supporters as 'pro-choice'. Similarly, while business often advertise 'cash discounts', they are very unlikely to promote 'credit surcharges'. Segregation explains how each aspect of a decision problem tends to be made without regard to the broader context of choice. In general, decisions are framed in terms of which factors are most relevant to the specific choice presented, rather than in terms of all relevant factors. For example, someone choosing between graduate programs might equate all offers which come with the same financial package, and then proceed to make the choice based on non-fiduciary factors. However, this may not take adequate account of the relative cost of living in the various areas and thus may eliminate an important factor from the overall decision context. Similarly, political decisions surrounding the level of foreign aid to be given to a particular country, such as Russia, often fails to take sufficient account of the level of corruption in the recipient nation; once the decision is made to give aid, associated features are often discounted or ignored until the problem receives wider attention from outside sources. Other editing operations further structure how options are presented for evaluation. These include: cancellation, which involves a process of discounting aspects of choices which produce similar outcomes; detection of dominance, which refers to the process by which people dismiss options which offer less desirable outcomes in all areas; and simplification, which amounts to discarding highly unlikely options from contention.
Evaluation is the second phase of prospect theory. This process involves two distinct functions. The first is the value function; the second is the weighting function. The value function has several notable properties which distinguish it from expected utility models. First, outcomes tend to be evaluated in terms of gains and losses relative to a status quo reference point, rather than in terms of final outcome positions. 2 In most expected utility models, final outcome position is more crucial than change from the previous position. In other words, what you end up with is more important than how much you gained; this is often represented in the international relations literature as the difference between absolute and relative gains seeking. Expected utility argues that absolute gains are what matter most; prospect theory would argue for the psychological primacy of relative positioning. The difference is that the reference point for prospect theory is one's own previous position, not that of another.
Second, the value curve is concave for gains and convex for losses. In other words, people tend to be risk seeking for losses, and risk averse for gains. While some models in rational choice allow for leaders to be risk averse, risk neutral, or risk acceptant (Bueno de Mesquita, 2000) , classic expected utility models assume that caution represents the better part of prudence and risk aversion should dominate rational decision-making in all areas.
Last, the value curve is much steeper for losses than for gains, meaning losses hurt more than equal gains please. This characteristic of loss aversion is a particularly powerful and robust manifestation of the theory writ large. Expected utility models make no accommodation for notions of loss aversion nor do they allow for different outcomes on the basis of domain.
The weighting function transforms the expected utility notion of subjective probability assessments. In prospect theory's weighting function, low probability events tend to be given too much subjective weight, while medium and high probability events are not given sufficient weight in decision-making relative to standard probability models. This propensity leads to consequences such as the certainty effect, where events which are either certain or impossible are given much greater subjective weight in decision-making than would be normatively justified. This bias is nicely illustrated by Zeckhauser's (as cited in Plous, 1993 ) experiment where he demonstrated that people will pay much more money to remove the first or the last bullet from a game of Russian roulette than they will pay to remove any of the intermediate bullets, although each bullet reduces the overall probability of death by the exact same amount, a little over 16 percent.
As a psychological theory of decision-making under conditions of risk, prospect theory has been applied to a variety of situations in political science (Jervis, 1994; McDermott, 1994; Boettcher, 1995; Berejikian, 1997; Kowert and Hermann, 1997) . Theoretical implications of prospect theory for political application have been explored in a number of diverse areas using central concepts such as loss aversion (Levy, 1994a, b; Jervis, 1989 Jervis, , 1994 , the status quo bias (Jervis, 1989) ; framing issues (Farnham, 1994a; McDermott, 1994) ; deterrence and bargaining negotiations (Stein, 1992) , and American foreign policy (McDermott, 1998) .
These applications have included new analyses and reinterpretations of such wide-ranging events as Roosevelt's behavior in the Munich crisis (Farnham, 1994b ); Japan's decision to launch a war on the United States in 1941 (Levi and Whyte, 1997) ; the impact of the domestic context on military intervention (Nincic, 1997) ; economic restructuring in Latin America (Weyland, 1996) ; the U-2 crisis; the Suez crisis; and the Iranian hostage rescue mission (McDermott, 1998) . In spite of these applications and contributions, prospect theory has also encountered many challenges in its application to political science (see Levy, 1997 , for a review). For example, one of the oft-noted criticisms of the applicability of prospect theory to real world conundrums is its failure to delineate some of the underlying mechanisms of framing effects, which remain one of its central theoretical suppositions. Clearly, the genesis of framing remains an important and fertile area for future research. However, the failure of prospect theory advocates to provide a fully delineated theory of framing should not render its descriptive and predictive insights meaningless; after all, few critics would invalidate expected utility models for its failure to develop a theory of how preferences originate.
As Tversky argued (personal communication, 1995) , the relevant question for the usefulness of a theory is whether any component part of it sheds light on explanatory concepts or tools which prove helpful in thinking through a given phenomenon. Which elements help to promote a more intelligent discussion of the events, processes, and people of interest? Prospect theory does this through its particular focus on framing, reference points, loss aversion, and relative outcomes.
Reason-based Choice
A third area of Amos Tversky's research focused on the mechanisms and procedures which underlie choice processes. One of the central arguments in this work (Shafir et al., 1993) is that individuals actively construct the reasons and justifications for their choices, so that they can explain and justify their thoughts and actions to themselves as well as others. In this model, people are not passive sailors on the seas of pre-existing preferences. They do not possess enduring clear-cut preferences which can be elicited merely by asking. Rather, preferences are created in the context of the choice process itself.
This reason-based choice model rejects the classical decision theory model for the more 'constructed' approach of psychological research (Shafir et al., 1993; Tversky, 1994) . 3 In reason-based choice, a decision-maker seeks to create and invoke good qualitative reasons for decisions that are made.
These reasons serve many functions, and are invoked both to construct and to justify a decision. For example, reasons help generate the relevant reference point from which people believe they are acting. As noted, acceptance of options as they are presented helps create the relevant reference point from which people evaluate changes in their position in prospect theory. These reference points, in turn, establish the domain in which people make decisions and take actions. Reasons are particularly important when the decision-maker knows that s/he will have to explain her/his choice to others who may not agree or when s/he her/himself is conflicted over the decision (Bem, 1972) .
While reason-based analyses may lack the parsimony of more formal modeling, they have many redeeming qualities. First, reason-based choice is closer to the way people think about their own decision-making processes than are normative mathematical or formal models. People are more likely to think in terms of arguments than numbers when first working through a problem.
Second, reason-based choice permits a full examination of framing effects in the context of each choice set. Intervention occurs when framing biases are made transparent through the simultaneous presentation of different frames of the same problem. For example, rather than presenting a public policy in terms of lives saved or lives lost, it might be presented in both ways side by side so that the substantive similarities become obvious.
Simultaneous presentation of various forms of a given option can reduce the acceptance effects which bias the starting reference point. This allows for the nature of conflict and value trade-offs to be made explicit to the decision-maker in the choice process. In this way, intervention improves the accuracy of the relationship between value and choice. Having made the values and frames explicit, decision-makers can be more confident of choosing options that further their policy goals, rather than being substantively affected by trivial transformations in presentation order or form which can be purposively manipulated by ignorant or unscrupulous advisers.
Finally, reason-based choice allows for a consideration of non-normative factors, such as affect, which can be quite powerful but are often ignored or purposely excluded from many normatively based analyses. Anger, hate, and revenge are potent motivators and justifications for war, for example, and yet are difficult factors to quantify. Emotions provide powerful reasons, but are rarely considered to provide normatively acceptable justifications for behavior (D'Amasio, 1994) .
The following discussion of various choice processes examines the processes by which people construct and create the reasons they need to justify the choices they make, especially those which involve painful trade-offs in values. Decision-makers rarely find it easy to openly acknowledge the costs of the choices they make, yet such costs often exist. Sometimes reframing costs as part of a separate problem, or worth the benefits, justifies the choice. But by excluding the recognition of costs in earlier parts of the decision-making process, decision-makers strive to avoid both the cognitive and emotional consequences of making choices which will inevitably hurt some people.
Ambiguity Aversion
Ambiguity refers to decisions where there are gaps in the information a person needs in order to render the best decision possible. Uncertainty occurs when an individual does not know the probability or likelihood that an event will occur; ambiguity can refer to a lack of information in any number of domains, not just probability. Ambiguity is a particularly common problem in political decision-making where the range of possible outcomes may be every bit as ambiguous as the likelihood that any given option will produce specific effects. In these cases, defining the relevant choice set can be difficult enough even without the challenges presented by value trade-offs between options.
It is well known that people prefer to choose between clear, as opposed to vague, outcomes (Camerer and Weber, 1992) . 4 The aversion to ambiguity among individuals is enhanced when decision-making processes invoke comparisons, either with less ambiguous events or more knowledgeable individuals (Fox and Tversky, 1995) . Thus, competition against a wellrespected enemy makes leaders very averse to ambiguous choices. By contrast, ambiguity aversion appears to be ameliorated when choice takes place in non-comparative contexts where individuals can evaluate a prospect in isolation. In non-comparative settings, people pay little attention to their lack of information or precision in assessing probabilities. Fox and Tversky (1995) interpret ambiguity aversion as a specific instance of inherently comparative source preference, whereby preference is affected by the source of uncertainty as much as by the degree of uncertainty.
This finding is provocative for what it implies about how decisions are affected by surrounding contexts that may not be fully appreciated by the decision-maker. A leader will certainly feel more competent in some issue areas than in others. For example, it is common for a president to feel more comfortable in one policy area, like foreign policy, than in another, such as domestic politics, or vice versa. In areas where a leader feels less competent, s/he will prefer more clear-cut options, while remaining more willing to tolerate greater ambiguity or uncertainty in areas where s/he feels more sure of her/his own knowledge. Further, a leader will be less likely to make clear choices when s/he knows that her/his decisions will be evaluated by others who s/he believes are more competent in a given area. This is similar to differences which exist between novices and experts in decision-making. While experts do tend to display the same biases in decision-making as novices (Dube-Rioux and Russo, 1988 ), experts do demonstrate better organized knowledge and a greater tolerance for inconsistent information (Fiske et al., 1983) .
Disjunction
One of the basic suppositions of standard expected utility theory is Savage's (1954) so-called Sure Thing Principle, which argues that if one choice is preferred to another regardless of whether a second event occurs or not, that choice should be preferred even when it is not known whether or not the second event will come about. Tversky originally became interested in this phenomenon while observing a faculty meeting concerning hiring. The faculty voted to make an offer to a second candidate if an offer to a first candidate was turned down; they also voted to make the offer to the second candidate if the first accepted the position. Yet they were unwilling to make the offer to the second candidate until they knew the decision of the first candidate (Shafir and Tversky, 1992; Kahneman and Shafir, 1998) . Clearly, the offer would be made to the second candidate regardless of the actions of the first, so the second offer was not contingent on the first candidate's response. Waiting for the first candidate's response would only be valuable because it would affect the reasons and justifications offered for the hire of the second candidate, not because it would affect the decision to hire itself. In this sense, reasons themselves change both the experience and the perception of the decision. Tversky and Shafir (1992a) demonstrated that people violate Savage's sure thing principle regularly in the presence of uncertainty. They refer to this dynamic as the disjunction effect. People often act as though certain choices are contingent on the outcome of other choices because the first outcome will affect the reasons for the second choice, not because the first outcome will affect the nature of the second choice itself. When people don't have a good reason for why they make the choices they do, they lack a means by which to justify their choice in the face of uncertainty, contradictory information, alternative choices or challenges from adversaries. When this happens, decision-makers tend to behave in ways contrary to Savage's prescriptions for rational decision-making. This finding has profound implications regarding the search for additional information in decision-making. People and organizations often pay a great deal, in terms of money and time, to get more information without stopping to evaluate whether new information will be useful. Even when information will have no discernible impact on the outcome of their choices, decision-makers often demand additional knowledge to provide reasons for choices. For example, assume that regardless of the outcome of elections in a foreign country, the United States will pursue good relations with that country. If a sympathetic leader wins, the US will trade for purposes of mutual economic gain. If an unsympathetic leader wins, the US will trade in order to have leverage and access to push for desirable political, economic or social change. If the US pursues trade regardless of leadership, then why spend large sums of money collecting extensive information about the outcome of elections for purposes of decisions concerning future trade? The only thing that changes as a result of this information is the justification, or reasons, for the trade, not the actual trade itself.
The application of the disjunction effect for understanding unjustified search for information provides rich insight into waste in intelligencegathering. In addition, it points to the loss of acuity that takes place in decision-making under conditions of uncertainty in general, where the focus of attention becomes diffuse in the face of so much ambiguity. Finding the right reason become more important than finding the truth because political framing shapes public opinion in definitive ways. Thus, although it may not be normatively advantageous to spend the time, effort, and money it takes to collect more information, it may not be irrational for purposes of political persuasion to do so.
Deferred Decisions
Conflict between options which promote different goals or values reaches to the heart of what can be difficult about political decision-making. In addition to conflict over desired outcomes, the existence of conflict itself can have an impact on the process of decision-making by making people angry or intransigent against certain people or ideas as well. Everyone knows someone who has voted against a position he supports merely to block or annoy an enemy who also supports it, for example.
Work by Tversky and Shafir (1992b) demonstrates that the tendency to delay decisions and to continue to seek new alternatives is much greater when conflict over values is high than when it is low. They argue that the tendency to defer decision-making, seek additional alternatives, and end up with an initially undesired default option are enhanced by strategies which enlarge or improve the choice set available to a decision-maker. In other words, more or better information tends to induce decisional paralysis.
As the authors point out, it is hard to overestimate the negative impact of the tendency to defer a choice on the quality of the decision itself. The more time people have to complete a task, the less likely they are to complete it at all. When conflict is high, and decisions are difficult, the tendency to delay taking any action at all in preference of a continued search for more acceptable options is enhanced. Under such conditions, the likelihood increases that a decision will never be made at all, and the resolution will fall to the default option which requires no active choice. Yet this is often the outcome that everyone tried to prevent from the start; the result is, in essence, everyone's least desired alternative.
Health-care reform serves as a good example of a case where difficult, conflictual decisions were delayed while various advocates searched for more appealing options. Note that the addition of other choices did not increase the likelihood that a decision would be reached, or that the quality of the options would improve. In the end, the decision was not only deferred, but the outcome reverted to the choice everyone sought to avoid from the outset: the continuation of the pre-existing system, including high rates of uninsured, skyrocketing costs, and inequality, based on wealth, of the quality of care.
Not only does this tendency to defer decision offer a useful insight into bureaucratic intransigence, it also helps explain why important, difficult decisions are sometimes never actually made actively, but rather fall to default responses, such as the continuation of a pre-existing policy that is considered sub-optimal by everyone from the outset. To avoid deferred decisions, change must be induced by exogenous shock, or leader manipulation.
Change happens when conflict decreases, time pressure forces a choice by a certain moment, or when the number of options decreases. For example, it should be impossible for the Catholic cardinals to choose a new pope. Most of them do not know each other or speak the same language. One of the reasons they are able to overcome their differences and choose a leader with great reliability and success on a regular basis is because they lock themselves into a small space until a decision is reached. Since no one wants to be stuck in a confined space with strangers for too long, this procedure induces the time pressure which forces a decision to be made. 5 Such structural incentives can be especially important when there is no default option available.
Trade-off Contrasts and Extremeness Aversion
Many normative theories assume that the value of a given option should not be affected by the nature or number of the other options that are available. However, the number and quality of options within which a choice is embedded can fundamentally affect, and substantively alter, the evaluation of each option and, subsequently, the choice that is made. Specifically, Tversky (1994) has demonstrated that enlarging the set of options which are presented to a decision-maker can greatly increase the attractiveness of particular options, while simultaneously decreasing the desirability of other prospects. This tendency represents a systematic violation of context independence as assumed by many rational theories of choice. Moreover, tradeoff contrasts and extremeness aversion provide strong explanations for such previously noted, but not well understood, biases as asymmetric dominance and compromise effects (Simonson and Tversky, 1992) . Tversky (1994; Simonson and Tversky, 1992) suggested that trade-off contrasts explain how a particular alternative's desirability can be enhanced or diminished within a particular choice set depending on whether the other options place that alternative in a favorable or unfavorable light. Options which place the alternative in a favorable condition enhance the likelihood that it will be chosen; options which reflect the less desirable aspects of the alternative diminish its chances of being chosen. In essence, trade-off contrasts highlight the effect of context on choice.
Trade-off contrasts are most likely to affect the content of choice when a decision-maker is presented with an additional choice that offers an improvement in one attribute combined with a larger decrease in a second attribute. For example, in choosing between job offers, a slight increase in status might have to be measured against a much lower salary. Adding a third offer which combined less status than the first with more money than the second would enhance the attractiveness of the first. Tversky (1994) suggests that the set of alternatives a decision-maker considers can include not only immediately available alternatives but also other options that have been encountered in the past as well.
The implication is that in a choice between two options, the first option will be enhanced by the addition of a third alternative which is inferior to the first option but not to the second. This form of presentation will increase the attractiveness of the first option to the decision-maker, and thus increase the likelihood that it will be chosen. For example, imagine a decision-maker confronted with public health policy concerns about epidemic increases in hepatitis infections. The decision-maker must choose between a very expensive but very effective policy of large-scale vaccinations and a less expensive but less effective public education policy designed to make people more aware of means and risks of transmission. A third option advocating free treatment for those who are already infected is added; this option is more expensive than the first but more effective than the second. The addition of this third option will increase the attractiveness of the first option, since treatment shows vaccination to be less expensive and only slightly less effective, while remaining clearly more effective than public education which is unlikely to reach those at highest risk. Tversky (1994) argues that this demonstration illustrates a rare example of people erring by complicating, rather than by simplifying, the cognitive work involved in decision-making by performing unnecessary evaluations and attending to irrelevant information. Decisions which involve a great deal of emotion or those which require the search for reasons to justify a choice to oneself or others might err in similar ways by complicating the value trade-offs required to reach cognitive closure.
A related finding posits the existence of an extremeness aversion where options with relatively extreme outcome values are judged to be relatively less attractive than more intermediate alternatives. This supports the notion that 'middle' options are often chosen when three alternatives are presented. The presence of extreme options makes the middle option seem like a more reasonable, and thus, more desirable compromise solution, even if all three designated options are extreme from a broader political perspective. This characterization of extremeness aversion represents a new interpretation of satisficing behavior. An example of this phenomenon is often seen in the selection of political candidates. Pat Buchanan might be considered moderate in the Christian Coalition but is certainly extreme in a broader political context, which includes candidates like George W. Bush, Jr and Al Gore.
Trade-off contrasts and extremeness aversions are indeed endemic in political decision-making, where almost all policy choices offer trade-offs on one dimension, such as cost, for benefits on another dimension, such as equity or efficacy. Extreme options, which might not only produce extreme outcomes, but might alienate powerful constituencies as well, serve to converge choices in the middle of the spectrum of options.
If trade-off contrasts can be highlighted in a systematic way by the number and extremeness of the options presented to a decision-maker, the possibilities for manipulation in creating preferences, as opposed to the mere elicitation presumed by rational choice theories, are myriad. Making an extreme policy option appear more moderate does not necessarily require changing the political landscape; it may merely require the addition of a more extreme option into the debate. The controversy over abortion rights shifts with the addition of late-term ('partial') abortions into the debate; and increased welfare appears moderate in the face of calls for a guaranteed income, for example.
Preference Reversal
As previously noted, elicitation effects have a huge impact on the context of choice. Normative theories typically assume that people have preferences that are consistent, no matter how they are evoked or ordered. Work on preference reversal has called this assumption into serious question in the last decade Tversky and Thaler, 1990) . Findings on preference reversal raise the question of whether preferences are elicited or constructed: do individuals espouse pre-existing preferences, and offer them on demand, or do they create them upon elicitation (Converse, 1964) ? When someone with no opinion is queried, s/he may answer in response to some trivial framing cue in method, form, or order of presentation, and remain unaware of the real factors influencing her/his decision (Nisbett and Wilson, 1977) . But once that choice is made, the chooser will generate reasons to justify that choice, thereby creating a preference where none existed prior to the act of elicitation (Bem, 1972) . To assume that elicited preferences are intrinsic or stable, as expected utility models do, is to vastly restrict the creativity inherent in the best decision-making. Shafir et al. (1993) reported that people prefer to consider the positive factors of an option when asked to choose a preferred option from a choice set, but were prone to consider the negative features of an option when asked to reject an option they don't like from the same set of options. The same set of options predict very different preferences based on the means of elicitation. For example, if an adviser wants to sell a leader on a particular program, like saving the salmon, it is best to provide positive reasons, like protecting biodiversity and fishermen's interests, for why the salmon is the best choice for environmental protection. On the other hand, if an adviser wants to use limited environmental money to promote clean air projects in the Pacific Northwest, then it is best to provide reasons for why protecting the salmon is the wrong choice for energy needs and the logging industry. Intuition supports the notion that people want compelling reasons both to justify good choices and reject bad ones. Simply put, choice does not merely elicit preference, but creates it (Cohen, 1964) .
Critiques
Obviously work which has been as wide-ranging and influential as Tversky's has engendered its fair share of controversy and debate. Two sets of related critiques from within the psychological community are worth noting.
One of Tversky's most adamant challengers, Gerd Gigerenzer (1996 Gigerenzer ( , 1991 Gigerenzer and Murray, 1987) , has focused on the nature and meaning of the so called 'cognitive illusions' which Tversky documented. Gigerenzer has argued that Tversky's subjects have fallen prey to cleverly constructed experiments which do not mimic the kinds of problems that individuals typically confront in their real lives. In particular, Gigerenzer has argued that when subjects are asked to estimate frequencies and not single events, as Tversky required, subjects do much better in judgment tasks. Gigerenzer believes that the more important question for cognitive psychology is not whether people fall prey to cognitive illusions but rather investigating the situations under which their frequency judgments are valid and those under which they are not.
Leda Cosmides and John Tooby have mounted similar attacks on Tversky's work from the perspective of evolutionary psychology. They argue (Brase et al., 1998; Rode et al., 1999 ) that Tversky's experiments trap subjects into making errors by mis-utilizing those aspects of human decision-making which are highly adaptive in most situations. Cosmides and Tooby have created a body of literature documenting the relatively skillful adaptiveness of human cognitive functioning. They argue that when individuals are tested in ways which mimic their real world tasks, they perform very well. For instance, subjects do much better in tasks that involve whole objects rather than segments or pieces of problems or objects (Brase et al., 1998) ; the authors argue that this is because people rarely are forced into the artificial judgments involving single events and unrealistically truncated tasks which are often invoked in Tversky-like experiments.
Conclusions
Psychological theories do not exist for the sake of political analysis alone any more than economic ones do. Yet both economic and psychological theories can be put to good use in political analysis when they offer unique perspectives and insights that are not available from more traditional viewpoints.
In many ways, Amos Tversky's psychological ideas do not simplify political analysis; in fact, the reverse is often the case. Yet Tversky's innovative contributions raise a broad array of psychological considerations that are particularly relevant for value-laden analysis or explanations of the political decision-making process.
There are two fundamental concerns that are brought to light by this examination of Tversky's ideas and their relevance to political science scholarship. One highlights the importance of reasons in decision-making. The second reflects the critical importance of context in decision-making.
Both these insights stress the extent to which preferences and values are constructed more than elicited. Prospect theory and reason-based choice represent powerful critiques of classical decision models, such as expected utility theory. This psychological perspective resonates strongly with important constructivist arguments within social science, in general, and political science, in particular. Without arguing that Tversky was a 'constructivist' in the political science sense, his work demonstrates that preferences are not always exogenous. Serious recognition of the fact that people often create preferences and values as they go through a decisionmaking process, using contextual cues for help, would require a fundamental rethinking of many models which assume that preferences are fixed and given.
When most lay people think about how they make important decisions, they often invoke a variant on Benjamin Franklin's suggestion of writing down a list of pros and cons, weighing each consideration by some subjective measure of its importance, and choosing the side with the greater total (Shafir et al., 1993) . While formal models may mimic that procedure in design, they certainly do not resemble it in process.
Reasons matter to people; when leaders make decisions, they need to provide compelling arguments for themselves and their constituents for why they chose as they did. While numerical comparisons might be more easily evaluated, many real world problems do not avail themselves readily or easily to that form. In addition, many constituents in the real world do not understand numerically based arguments as well or as easily as good verbal arguments. Conflict enters decisions precisely when decision-makers have good reasons for and against a particular option, or equally good reasons for several different options. Compelling reasons add independent value to the outcome of decision-making. Rational models of choice often do not offer such succor to intuitive decision-makers.
Hard decisions are hard precisely because they involve some element of conflict over goals, values, or options. Easy decisions do not force such challenges. But hard decisions require careful consideration precisely because of the trade-offs involved in giving up some of one thing in order to have more of another.
Reason-based choice offers an interesting alternative for analyzing decisions in context, taking full account of the various historical and political forces which tend to offer reasons and justifications for decisions. Formal models may be more appropriate for economic and even experimental psychological analysis, but are often poorly suited for single, nonquantifiable events such as those which commonly occurs in real world political contexts. In these cases, emotion and reasons are crucial in creating and formulating political choices.
If preferences and values are constructed more than elicited, as strongly indicated by the empirical evidence on preference reversal in particular, then people must often make complex and confusing choices in the relative absence of clear pre-existing preferences, values or goals. In short, decisionmakers become highly susceptible to 'spin'. Under such conditions, Krantz (1991: 34) may be correct when he argues that:
the normative assumption that individuals should maximize some quantity may be wrong. Perhaps . . . there exists nothing to be maximized . . . [B] ecause the calculations are impossible in principle: People do and should act as problem solvers, not maximizers, because they have many different and incommensurable . . . goals to achieve.
As problem-solvers, and not value-maximizers, individuals can claim the freedom to be as complex and unpredictable in theory as they unquestionably are in reality; and if theory seeks to understand and explain human behavior, in political decision-making and elsewhere, then psychological considerations are as intricate a part of that phenomenon as anything can be. In addition, Amos Tversky contributed as much to furthering that psychological understanding as anyone. Hopefully political science scholars can utilize his work more fully to generate greater understanding of political processes as well.
